Market Bootstrapping

Market-relative diffusion avoids a core failure mode of “one global seed set”: fragmented-but-real markets. Early markets can also be sparse, so the protocol supports capital-backed bootstrapping without discretionary grants.

This page defines:

Market-relative teleport: a per-market, protocol-committed teleport distribution
Endogenous market seeds: hard-to-fake “earned” anchors inside a market
Market Anchors: capital-backed exogenous anchors that can seed markets early
Market Vaults: a per-market credit-line primitive that funds early rewards and gets repaid from future fees

Why market-relative teleport exists

In marketplace networks, trust is often local to a market context:

a courier can be highly trusted in one city/vertical even if the global network is fragmented
a new market can be economically real even if it’s weakly connected to global anchors

If the protocol used one global seed set, naturally isolated markets would look “low influence” even when they are honest. To avoid that, diffusion (and claims derived from it) are evaluated relative to a market marketId = m, using the market’s committed teleport distribution .

Per-market seed commitments (root of roots)

Seeds are not user-chosen. The protocol commits to them each epoch so that claims and audits can be verified against a fixed reference.

The chain commits to per-market seed tables via a root-of-roots:

A safety tether: market seeds mixed with a tiny global baseline

Market-relative seeding fixes fragmented real clusters, but it introduces a risk: market capture (a cartel tries to become the market’s only “truth source”).

To reduce capture risk without creating per-market governance, the teleport distribution can be defined as a fixed mixture:

Recommended seed construction rule (deterministic, low-governance)

The protocol builds the market-local teleport mass from a union of endogenous and exogenous anchors, then normalizes and clips.

1) Endogenous anchors (earned seeds): diversity + time, not volume

Let Window_t be the last epochs (a global constant). A participant is endo-eligible in market iff:

Verified(v)

2) Exogenous anchors (Market Anchors): concave weight from locked capital

Market Anchors are addresses that lock capital into the MarketVault for market and opt into anchor status. Exogenous anchor weight is deliberately concave in capital:

3) Mixture + clipping

Then apply a per-address cap (e.g., ) and renormalize.

Market Vaults: a “startup credit line” primitive for a market

Market Vaults are a mechanism for funding early incentives without ad-hoc grants. They work like a credit facility: capital is supplied up-front, and the market repays it with future fees if the market succeeds.

Each market can have a MarketVault contract that supports:

Deposits (credit supply): anchors deposit capital into the vault
Draws (protocol borrows): the protocol can draw from the vault to fund early reward budgets under policy limits
Repayment (fees repay): as the market generates fees, a fixed share routes back to the vault until draws are repaid (plus a policy-defined yield to depositors)

Fee attribution is ledger-defined

For a market in epoch , define as the realized protocol fee total attributed to market during epoch .

Mechanically, is derived from finalized execution output:

sum of fee over finalized InteractionRecords with marketId = m during epoch

See: Market Registry

Vault invariants (mechanical constraints)

To avoid emissions-farming and rent-to-control dynamics, vault rules are mechanical and bounded. Common invariants include:

Fee-first yield: yield is paid primarily from realized market fees.
Draw limit: outstanding draws capped as a fraction of deposits:

Risk haircut / clawback: if dispute/fraud losses exceed thresholds, repayment/yield is haircutted under policy.
Lockup for anchors: deposits that confer seed weight require a minimum lock duration.